Abstract. Corners were prevalent in the nineteenth
Introduction

Although stock markets are far better regulated today than in the nineteenth century, market manipulations by large investors and insiders
also reported a price manipulation in the copper market by a rogue trader at the Japanese trading firm Sumitomo. More recently British Petroleum has been investigated by the SEC for the possibility of cornering the U.S. propane market in early 2004. 4 There is a growing theoretical literature on market manipulation. Hart (1977) , Hart and Kreps (1986) , Vila (1987 Vila ( , 1989 , Allen and Gale (1992) , Allen and Gorton (1992) , Benabou and Laroque (1992) , and Jarrow (1992 Jarrow ( , 1994 were among the first to study market manipulation. Cherian and Jarrow (1995) survey this early literature. Subsequent contributions include Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) , Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a, b) , and Goldstein and Guembel (2003) . Kumar and Seppi (1992) discuss the possibility of futures manipulation with cash settlement. Pirrong (1993) shows how squeezes hinder price discovery and create deadweight losses. Vitale (2000) considers manipulation in foreign exchange markets. Van Bommel (2003) shows the role of rumors in facilitating price manipulation. Galbraith (1972) , Mahoney (1999) and Jiang et al. (2005) find little evidence of price manipulation for the stock pools. However, there are a few recent studies that have found evidence of market manipulation. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) present a theory and some empirical evidence on stock price manipulation in the United States. Extending the framework of Allen and Gale (1992) , they show that more information seekers imply greater competition for shares in a market with manipulators, making it easier for a manipulator to enter the market and potentially worsen market efficiency. Using a unique dataset from SEC actions in cases of stock manipulation, they find that more illiquid stocks are more likely to be manipulated and manipulation increases stock volatility. Khwaja and Mian (2005) discover evidence of broker price manipulation by using a unique daily trade level data set from the main stock market in Pakistan. They find that brokers earn at least 8% higher returns on their own trades. While neither market timing nor liquidity provision offer sufficient explanations for this result, they find compelling evidence for a specific For example, the SEC intervened in 1996 when the share price of Comparator Systems Corporation (a finger print identification company with net assets of less than $2 million) soared from 3 cents to $1.03, valuing the company at a market capitalization of over a billion dollars. An astonishing 180 million Comparator shares were traded on the Nasdaq Exchange on May 6, 1996 . See also Aggarwal and Wu (2006) . 4 See the Wall Street Journal of June 29, 2006 , "U.S. Accuses BP of manipulating Price of Propane". et al. (2005) Felixon and Pelli (1999) test for closing price manipulation in the Finnish stock market and find evidence of it. They find that block trades and spread trades explained a part, but not all of the observed manipulation. Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . There are two assets; one is safe and one is risky with a random payoff and an unobservable random aggregate per capita supply. There are three groups: arbitrageurs, the uninformed, and a manipulator. The arbitrageurs receive a signal that indicates whether the payoff on the risky asset will be high or low. We first consider equilibrium when there is no manipulator present. There exists a pooling equilibrium where the arbitrageurs go long in the risky asset when they receive a good signal and short when they receive a bad signal. The price of the risky asset is such that the uninformed cannot distinguish between situations where there is a good signal and the supply is large and situations where there is bad signal and supply is low. This allows the market to clear at the same price in both situations. We then introduce the manipulator. He can with some probability buy up the floating supply and this allows him to corner the market when the arbitrageurs are short. They are forced to settle at a high price when the corner succeeds. This possibility means that they will only short the stock when the potential profits offset the risk of being cornered. However, for prices close to their expectation of the stock's payoff it is not worthwhile for them to take a short position. As a result the market is less efficient than when corners are not possible. Nevertheless it is rational for all agents to participate. 
In contrast, the empirical literature is quite limited. Although the wide-spread manipulation through stock pools before the Crash of 1929 is vividly documented in
provide empirical evidence on learning in the market place and on the strategic behavior of market participants by studying an attempted delivery squeeze in the March 1998 long-term UK government bond futures contract traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE).
We then go on to provide a clinical study of market corners from the robberbaron era to the Great Depression of the 1930s to the 1980s. 5 This involves several contributions: first, we have put together by hand a novel data set of price and trading volume based on historical newspapers from the New York Times and the
Theoretical Analysis
THE MODEL
The model of corners developed in this section is a variant of Grossman and Stiglitz's (1980) 
(1) θ and ε are independent random variables that cannot be publicly observed. As we will see, some traders can privately observe θ. The distribution of θ is θ B = Eθ − η with probability 0.5, θ G = Eθ + η with probability 0.5.
The mean of the distribution is Eθ and the variance is η 2 . θ B corresponds to the bad state and θ G to the good one. ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 ε . Since θ and ε are independently distributed we have
The aggregate per capita supply of the risky asset at date 0, x, that is available for trading is stochastic. This is the "free float". It is uniformly distributed between 0 and x H , is independent of θ and ε, and cannot be observed.
Agents
There are three types of agent, the uninformed, the arbitrageurs, and the manipulator.
The uninformed constitute a proportion λ of the population, and they behave competitively. They have a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function,
where W 1 is wealth at date 1. Each uninformed person is endowed with wealth W 0 at date 0 and purchases S U of the safe asset and X U of the risky asset so their budget constraints at dates 0 and 1 are
The It can be shown using the moment generating function for the normal distribution that the demand of the uninformed X U is given implicitly by
If the arbitrageurs are uninformed their demand will be as follows Market clearing requires
The form of the equilibrium depends on how large a position the arbitrageurs can take relative to the aggregate per capita supply. Suppose initially that X * A = X * A1 where
In this case the equilibrium has the form shown by the solid line in Figure 1 . The arbitrageurs bid the price to P = Eθ and the uninformed hold nothing at this price since they are risk averse so
the arbitrageurs do not have enough wealth to hold the entire supply when x is high. In this case the price must fall so that the uninformed will be willing to hold the asset. Since P < Eθ the arbitrageurs will have X A = X * A2 . Using this with (7) in (9) and rearranging gives The equilibrium is shown in Figure 1 . For x ≤ (1 − λ)X * A2 , only the arbitrageurs hold the asset and then for higher x the relationship between P and x is given by (12) as shown by the dotted line.
EQUILIBRIUM WITH JUST ARBITRAGEURS INFORMED
Suppose next that only the arbitrageurs observe θ at date 0 before they trade. If they observe θ G (θ B ), we say that they receive good (bad) news. There are again a number of forms the equilibrium can take. Suppose (10) is satisfied. Similarly to Figure 1 , the arbitrageurs bid the price to reflect the information they receive and hold all of the assets. The equilibrium price is fully revealing as shown in Figure 2 by the solid lines. When good news is observed the price is bid to θ G and the uninformed know that v is normally distributed with mean θ and variance σ 2 ε When bad news is received the price is bid to θ B and the uninformed again know v is normally distributed but now with mean θ B .
When (11) is satisfied then the uninformed must again hold some of the asset. One possibility is that prices are fully revealing. Figure 2 shows this type of equilibrium. When the arbitrageurs observe the good signal, they hold all of the risky assets for x ≤ (1 − λ)X * A2 at P = θ G . For x > (1 − λ)X * A2 , the uninformed hold the remainder of the risky assets. Since they are able to deduce the arbitrageurs' information from the price we have using the fact that v is N(θ G , σ 2 ε ) and the moment generating function for the normal distribution,
Using this and X A = X * A2 in the market-clearing condition (9), we obtain similarly to (12) that the demand curve is given by
When bad news is received the analysis is the same except that θ G is replaced by θ B . The equilibrium in Figure 2 Figure 3 . For the range of prices P 1 > P > P 2 marked "Pooling", the uninformed cannot distinguish between good news and a high value of x and bad news and a low value of x. Since good news and bad news are equally likely and x is uniformly distributed, no information is contained in the price. The demand of the uninformed is given by (7) . If only they were to hold the risky asset, market clearing would require
so using this in (7),
This demand curve is shown by the dotted line through Eθ marked "Uninformed" in Figure 3 . In fact the arbitrageurs are also in the market. If they receive good news about the stock (observe θ G ) then they go long X * A in the risky asset. Using this, (7), and the market clearing condition (9), gives
This is shown by the line marked "Good News" in Figure 3 . If the arbitrageurs get bad news about the stock (observe θ B ) then they go short − X * A in the risky asset and in this case
where the equilibrium is similar to Figure 2 . Similarly, for x 2 < x < x H when there is bad news there is again revelation as shown in Figure 3. 
CORNERS
In order for corners to occur, there must be short sales in equilibrium. Hence the equilibria shown in Figures 1 and 2 are not susceptible to corners. However, the equilibrium in Figure 3 does have short sales and there is potential for a manipulator to corner the market. We shall therefore focus on this case.
It is assumed that the manipulator has the same information as the arbitrageurs and thus knows whether they have gone long or short. In the latter case the short sellers will need to cover their positions at date 1. In order to do this they must be able to buy up the shares. We assume that with probability π the manipulator will 
In order to find P M this level of utility must be equated to that obtained from selling X U at this price so 
It can be seen from (21) 
The first term represents the possibility of being cornered. There is a probability π(1 − ϕ) that this occurs. The arbitrageur sells the borrowed stock for P at date 0 and has to settle with the manipulator for P C at date 1. The second term represents the expected profit when the market is not cornered. There is a probability 1 − π(1 − ϕ) this happens. The arbitrageur sells the stock for P at date 0 and can cover at date 1 for the expected payoff θ B . Rearranging (22) gives
The equilibrium is shown in Figure 4 . For P * > P ≥ Figure 4 is above the price in Figure 3 
This expression can be understood as follows. There is a probability π that the manipulator will attempt to corner the market and a probability ( 
Next consider the determination of P M in (20) . Since the first derivative of the left hand side with respect to η is negative, putting η = 0 increases the left hand side. Denoting the solution for P M for the case when η = 0, P * M , it can be shown
Using this in (25) 
Historical Data and Institutional Background
One of the main hurdles in studying market manipulation is that the data are hard to obtain since the activity is often illegal and thus the participants do their best to hide it. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) and Mei et al. (2004) get around this problem by using prosecution cases filed by the SEC. This paper overcomes the hurdle by looking at a special form of manipulation -market corners. We identify market corners by going through the stock market chronology compiled by Wyckoff (1972 We double check all the corners reported by Wyckoff (1972) using reports by Brooks (1969) , Clews (1888) , Sobel (1965) , Stedman (1905) , and Thomas (1989 Clews (1888) , Flynn (1934) , Thomas (1989 ), and Wycoff (1968 , 1972 Gordon (1999) 11 See Gordon (1999, p. 105 Gordon (1999, pp. 105-106) . 13 See Wyckoff (1972, p. 239) . 14 See Sobel (1988, p. 161) . 15 See Sobel (1988, pp. 154-196) and Gordon (1999, p. 116) . 16 See Gordon (1999, p. 114) . 17 See Gordon (1999, p. 124) . 18 See Wyckoff (1972, p. 29 Table I Gordon (1999, pp. 217-218) and Brooks (1969, pp. 29-33) . 20 See Wyckoff (1972, p. 72 
Empirical Results
The data for this study is collected from historical records of the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal (see
115). However, a Wilcoxon test of the equality of the means of the average turnover in pre-corner period and in corner period one cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the means (p-value is 0.53). Similarly, comparing panels B and C of Table II, there is a decrease in the average daily turnover in the corner period two (0.049) as compared with corner period one (0.115). A Wilcoxon test of equality of the means of corner period one and corner period two rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the means at the 10% significance level (p-value is 0.07). One caveat in our interpretation of turnover results above is that the available float may be much smaller than the outstanding float. Thus, such comparisons of daily turnover before and during the corner event might be difficult to interpret.
We also analyze autocorrelation patterns in Table II Llorente et al. (2002) . This is investigated further below. Table III the properties of a measure of illiquidity, similar to the one in Amihud (2002) :
One of the predictions of our theoretical model is that corners would have a large impact on liquidity. To test this prediction, we have examined in
where 24 We illustrate this pattern in Figure 6 , where we display the average daily illiquidity measure across successful and failed corner stocks,
25
The figure shows the increased illiquidity following the corner date, with greater illiquidity for the successful corners.
In Table IV 25 Note that in Figure 6 we
we present a comparison of successful and failed corners. The comparison is based on standardized abnormal trading volume, price dispersion, stock illiquidity (defined in (27)), an abnormal illiquidity measure (defined below), excess returns, and market-adjusted returns. The table records coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics, based on a regression of each of the above variables on a constant, where we use the Newey-West correction to address autocorrelation-in-residuals concerns for the corner period 1 and for the corner period 2. traded in day t, and P t is the close price (in cents per ounce) as of trading day t. We translate this measure into millions US dollars and adjust it for inflation in order to make it comparable across corners which occur in different time periods. The adjustment is based on the inflation conversion factors for the US dollar from 1863 to 1980 which we obtain from Robert
have excluded the observations for Prairie du Chien. Due to its low trading volume in the second corner period, the illiquidity measure for that stock is substantially higher than the illiquidity measures for the rest of our sample corner stocks. The conservative approach we follow would bias our results against finding support for our hypothesis that liquidity would decrease after the corner event and would further ascertain that our results are not driven by outliers.
Table III. Illiquidity measure for corner stocks
The illiquidity measure is defined as in Amihud (2002) , where . Average daily illiquidity measure for corner stocks. We define the average daily illiquidity measure across successful and failed corner stocks as Amihud (2002) (−1.56) while returns for the failed corner are relatively flat at 8% on the corner date in Figure 7 . One concern in the computation of the excess returns above is that the precorner period may contain manipulation activity. We would expect that this would bias our estimates since we use the pre-corner period to compute market betas, and averages of the stock returns and stock volumes. To address this concern, we also exhibit in Table IV Figure 8 . The successful corner stocks have higher daily price dispersion compared to the failed ones, reaching 36.2% on the date of the corner (for failed corners the price dispersion is 5.5%). The large price dispersion in the case of successful corners is indicative of the presence of private information trading and it reflects the volatile nature of market corners.
where VOLD i,t is the daily dollar trading volume (in million of dollars), adjusted for inflation, R i,t is the daily return for stock i, and t indexes trading days (see
.6%), but it increases slightly for failed corners (3.3%). This pattern of increased price dispersion (reflective of information trading) is also displayed in
We also study in Table IV the stock illiquidity around the corner date. We define stock illiquidity as in Equation (27) Table IV indicate that there is an increase in the illiquidity measure after the corner for both successful and failed stocks. The increase is more than two fold for successful corners: from 0.13 in the first corner sub-period to 0.29 in the second corner sub-period. Similarly, we observe an increase in the illiquidity for failed corners, but by lower magnitude: from 0.03 in the first corner sub-period to 0.04 in the second sub-corner period. Successful corners are subject to substantially higher illiquidity following the corner as compared to failed ones. We further report a measure of abnormal illiquidity, defined as the average of the daily illiquidity measure from Equation (27) in the corner period in excess of the average daily illiquidity measure in the pre-corner period. When computing abnormal illiquidity we still exclude Prairie du Chien from the calculation, due to its low trading volume. Based on the abnormal illiquidity measure, it appears that illiquidity for failed corners within corner periods one and two is not statistically different from the pre-corner value. The illiquidity for successful corners for corner period one is statistically significantly lower than the illiquidity from the pre-corner period. The illiquidity for successful corners in corner period two is statistically significantly higher than the illiquidity in the pre-corner period. This demonstrates the ability of the manipulator in successful corners to withhold the acquired free float after the corner date, while at the same time make it freely available in the corner period one.
. We exclude Prairie du Chien when computing the illiquidity measure due to its low trading volume (low trading volume results in
exceedingly high values of the illiquidity measure). This biases us against finding support for our hypothesis of strong impact of the corner event on liquidity. The results in
In Table V Figure 9 where we have presented the cumulative market return around the corner date. As discussed above the impact of successful corners on market returns seems to be transient. However, the impact of failed corners on market returns seems to be more pronounced and persistent.
In Table VI, ship in the corner period. We use the theoretical implications of Llorente et al. (2002) , running the following regression: 27 In their work, Llorente et al. (2002) Llorente et al. (2002) (Llorente et al. (2002)) We present the results of the regression 
we present a test of whether there is trading on private information as in our theoretical model, based on the dynamic return-trading volume relation-
, ∀i, t. * indicates 10% level significance while ** indicates 5% level significance.
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Obs. Chancellor (2000, chapter 6 ) and Allen and Gale (1992) . 30 Clews (1888, chapter 34) and Sobel (1988 Chancellor (2000, chapter 6) . 33 Chancellor (2000, chapter 6 ).
The Erie Corner 34 (November 1868)
In late 1868, Drew and Gould were involved in a bear raid on the market by selling Erie and other stocks short. Then they tried to force the interest rates up and a general market decline by a large withdrawal of funds from New York banks. Agitated by Drew's wavering during the operation, Gould suddenly switched his strategy from bear raid to bull run. Unaware of Gould's switch, Drew kept on selling Erie short. The price dropped from $50 to $40 in October and went further down to $35 on November 13. But Gould by then had bought all the floating shares of Erie. On November 16, the price suddenly jumped to $55 and Drew was cornered with 70,000 shares short.
The Failed Gold Corner 35 (1869)
In 1868, the whole floating supply of gold was about $20 million and the government held about $75 million in reserve. Jay Gould thought that this whole supply could be cornered and thus selling it at an inflated price. He conspired with Abel Corbin, the brother-in-law of President Grant, to influence government policy on gold. On numerous occasions, he lobbied Grant and government officials on the benefits of high gold prices. For a moment, it appeared that Grant was quite convinced. Gould proceeded to accumulate a $50 million position in gold and the price had risen from 130 to 137. To increase his chance of success, Gould then launched an aggressive lobbying of government officials who began to suspect his speculative motives. Sensing the government might intervene to break his corner, he secretly sold his position while urging his friends to buy at any price. On October 4, the feverish purchase by Gould's friends had pushed the gold price from 140 to 160, but government selling later during the day quickly broke the squeeze and brought the price back to $140. This day had gone down in history as another Black Friday, since hundreds of firms on Wall Street were ruined by the huge price swing.
The Failed Erie Corner 36 (1872)
In the summer of 1872, Jay Gould asked Daniel Drew and Henry Smith to join him for a bear raid on Erie stocks. They conspired to depress the stocks by suddenly withdrawing large sums of money from New York banks, which created a small liquidity crisis due to the lack of lenders of last resort at the time. But Drew turned bullish after their initial success. So he reversed his trades and proceeded to build a large position without notifying Gould and Smith. On September 17, he cornered the market by calling for a settlement. But Gould was able to deliver the stocks. However, the corner had a large impact on the prices of all stocks.
34 Sharp (1989) . 35 Chancellor (2000, chapter 6 ). 36 Chancellor (2000, chapter 6 Chancellor (2000, chapter 6) . 38 See New York Times, November 26th, 1872 and also Chancellor (2000, p. 171) . 39 Thomas (1989) , Sobel (1988) and Wycoff (1968) . 40 Kyle and Xiong (2001) develop a model that captures the contagion effect. 41 Oldfield (2006) and Brooks (1969 Brooks (1969) and Markham (2001) . 43 Thomas (1989 Figure 1A .
44 Dow Jones New Service, 4/30/1980, "Volcker Says Hunts Seeking Over $1 Billion For Silver Debts" and "Volcker Discloses Hunt Silver Debts". 
